

A  
VINDICATION  
OF THE  
CASE  
OF  
Indifferent Things,  
USED  
In the Worship of God:  
IN  
ANSWER  
TO A  
BOOK,  
INTITULED,

*The Case of Indifferent things used in the Worship of God, Examined, Stated on the behalf of the Dissenters, and calmly argued.*

L O N D O N,

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VINDICATION

OF THE

CASE

OF

Indifferent Things.

OF

In the Worshipping of GOD

IN

AN SWER

TO

BOOK

INTITLED

THE HISTORY OF THE

LONDON

A  
VINDICATION  
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**Indifferent Things,**  
USED  
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**A**MONGST some Tracts published within the year for the resolution of such doubts, as the Dissenters from our Church plead for refusing Communion with it, there was one that respected the use of Indifferent things in the Worship of God. This some one of our Brethren chose to examine and to *begin his debate with*; in the management of which whether he hath dealt *closely and ingenuously* (to use his own words)

*Case examined,*  
P. 4.  
p. 16

# A Vindication of the Case

I shall take the liberty to enquire, and must leave others to judge.

PAGE 2.

I confess I was not a little surprized, that before he had set one foot forward, he should thus assault me, *If that R. person had been pleased to have determined who is to be Judge of things Indifferent, as to a man's practice, whether his own conscience or his Superior &c. he would (in our opinion) have made the matter in dispute much fitter for an argument, whereas the most Dis-senters judge, that as he hath stated it, he hath but beg'd the Question.* If the dispute had been betwixt Protestant and Papist, there might have been some colour to have spent 4 pages in ~~so~~ upon this Argument; though even betwixt such there may be 20 cases controverted in which this Demand would be impertinent: But to put it upon this issue when both sides are in the main agreed (as it is betwixt Protestant and Protestant) is ~~a running the Question out of its wits~~, and an hearty ~~begging it~~, before he puts it. It stops the unwary Reader with prejudice, to puzzle the cause, and is the way to make every little Tract a Volume. In matters of Controversy there are always some principles supposed, and to put an Adversary upon the proof of them, shews a design rather to cavil than to end the dispute, and is a shrewd sign that the person so doing is either diffident of his cause, or his own ability to defend it; but to return his own complement, *we will not presume any thing so absurd or disingenuous of so worthy a person.*

P. 10.

(a) The difference of the Case between the separation of Protestants from Rome, &c. p. 42, &c.

But how remote soever this Question is to the business in hand, yet because our Author asks it with some kind of seriousness, I shall direct him where he may have satisfaction, and that in a Judicious Tract lately published (a); or if he hath the patience to compare the things, as I have done, he may find it resolved



ved by himself, in his *Case examined*. (b) But in my mind there is a much nearer way to end controversies, which is not by disputing *who shall be Judge?* But by enabling men to judge for themselves in a clear stating of the case, and setting forth the nature of the things disputed: As in the case before us, the ready way, one should think, is to shew what is the nature of Things Indifferent, and that things thus Indifferent may be lawfully used in Divine Worship, and because they may be abused, to enquire how we are to apply them.

This was the way I took, and if I did manage it as it should, I am pretty confident that the *Question was not beg'd*, though I never thought of coming near his Question, *who shall be the Judge?*

But that is the thing to be disputed, Whether the case was rightly stated and proved, and this brings me to the consideration of what he hath offer'd against it. Before I enter upon which, I shall only remind the Reader, that in the little Tract concerned in the present dispute, the Question undertaken was;

*Case of Indifferent things.*

*Q. Whether things in their own nature Indifferent, though not prescribed in the Word of God, may be lawfully used in Divine Worship?*

In answer to which;

1. *I enquired into the Nature, and stated the Notion of Indifferent Things.*

2. *Skew'd that Things Indifferent may be lawfully used in Divine Worship.*

3. *Considered how we might know what things are Indifferent in the Worship of God.*

4. *How we are to determine our selves in the use of them.*

To most of these our Author hath somewhat to say, to some more to some less; but to the First, he saith, *There*

## A Vindication of the Case

*is none of the Dissenters, but agreeth with this Author in his Notion of Things Indifferent, that they are such things as by the Divine Law are neither injoyed nor forbidden.*

Now before I proceed I shall observe that this confession of his will bereave them of some of the common and most considerable arguments that they use in this controverſie; As,

*Concluſ. 1.* *If Things Indifferent are ſuch as are neither injoyed nor forbidden, it muſt follow that things are not unlawful in Divine Worſhip becauſe they are not commanded.*

The conſequence is plain and undeniable: For if the Nature of Things Indifferent be, as abovesaid, *what are neither commanded nor forbidden*, there is nothing can make this or that to be unlawful but the being forbidden: But now if the being *not Commanded* is the ſame with the *being Forbidden* then the notion of Indifferent Things cannot conſiſt in this that they are neither Commanded nor Forbidden. So that either they muſt quit the Argument, and grant that the being *not Commanded*, doth not make a thing unlawful in Divine Worſhip; or they muſt alter the notion of Indifferent things, and indeed utterly exterminate them, and leave no ſuch middle things in nature, and ſay that there is nothing elſe but Duty or Sin.

*p. 25.* Now after our Reverend Author hath ſo frankly granted this, I cannot underſtand how he can ſay that *the doing of a thing in Gods Worſhip, not Commanded, is guilt enough*: nor why he ſhould take ſuch pains to oppoſe what I have offered in confutation of that principle. For what can he plead for the unlawfulness of things *not Commanded*, who hath granted that the being *not Commanded* is a branch of ſuch things as are Indifferent: And if he will maintain it, he muſt do it  
upon

upon no less absurdity, than the saying a thing Indifferent is forbidden; or (which is the same) that Indifferent things, are such as are either forbidden, or not forbidden.

But let us abstract the Case of things *not Commanded* from this consequence, and take it as it is in the Tract Case of Indifferent Things *afore said, an Objection and Answer, and yet then we shall see what an imperfect account our Author gives of it.* P. 20.

He saith, *What our Author saith is no more than hath been many times said, viz. [that by things not Commanded are meant things forbidden] and hath nothing to prove it by, but only that the things mentioned in Scripture to which that phrase is applied were things forbidden, as Idolatry, &c.* Case Examined, p. 25.

Though what he produceth out of the Case be sufficient, yet he extremely forgets himself when he saith, *nothing, but only*; since in the page he quotes, there are two arguments, that are sooner slip'd than answered. But however what hath he to reply to that which *bath been many times said*? He grants, *It is true.* Case of Indifferent Things, p. 20.

And is this nothing toward the proof of it? What fitter way have we to find out the meaning of a phrase, than to consider the several places where it is used? Or to ascertain the sense of it, than to shew that it's always alike applied to such a case, or thing?

But in answer to this, he asks, *Why are such things express'd to us in this phrase, as, Not Commanded only?*

*1<sup>st</sup>.* I answer, they are not thus express'd, as, *Not commanded Only.* For the things said to be *not commanded*, are either in their own nature, or in Scripture absolutely Forbidden (as I have shewed, and he grants) and therefore to limit the phrase, as if there was no more intended in it than that the things are not commanded.

## A Vindication of the Case

manded (as the Word *Only* implies) and not also forbidden is to thwart Scripture, as well as my reasoning from it.

2<sup>ly</sup>. If we take the Phrase as it is, yet there his Question, *Why are they thus express'd, and not commanded?* is of no Importance; for supposing we could give no Reason for such an use of it, that would not be sufficient to question the Thing, as long as we find it constantly so used and applied. But,

3<sup>ly</sup>. Was there no Reason offer'd, no account given of it? Let him peruse the Tract he opposeth, (as sure he did) and he will find it expressly undertaken, and two Reasons given for it; as, 1. Things forbidden are called *not commanded*, because *all things prohibited are by consequence not commanded, and not e contra*. 2. *It's by way of Meiosis, &c.* But these, though to the purpose in hand, were not, I am afraid, to his:

Well! Let us consider,

4<sup>ly</sup>. What Account our Author himself gives at last of this.

1. Saith he, Things forbidden in Scripture are said to be not commanded, *To let us know the doing of a thing not commanded in God's Worship, is Guilt enough.* Surely not so great, as to do a thing notoriously forbidden, (as I there shewed.) Surely it can be no Guilt at all to do a thing not commanded, if not also forbidden, because (as he owns) there are Indifferent Things in the Worship of God; and what are indifferent Things, but Things not commanded, as well as not forbidden?

*Case Indiff.  
Things. pag. 20.*

2. He saith, it was so express'd, because *the Guilt of the Sin of Idolatry and Superstition lay in this, that it was a thing not commanded: had God commanded those things, they had been a true Worship, and acceptable.*

In which assertion of his, he grossly mistakes. First, as to the nature of Idolatry and Superstition, when he saith, *the guilt of them lay in this, that they were things not commanded*: Whereas it is evident that they were Sins, because forbidden. For what is Superstition but the dreading of that which is not to be dreaded? (as the Greek word shews;) Such as *the Signs of Heaven*, Divinations, and Dæmons, and even the unreasonable and inordinate fear of God himself. When we fear Jer. 10. 2. offending him, in what is not offensive to him. And what is Idolatry but the giving Divine honour to that which is not God, or prohibited honour to the true and only God? These are things manifestly forbidden.

Secondly, It's yet a grosser Error, which is contained in the reason he gives for it, *viz.* That had God Commanded those things, *they had been a true Worship and acceptable*. An assertion, First, that confounds the Nature of things, that makes Vice and Vertue alike, and no otherwise discriminated but by Gods written Law, as if Idolatry and Superstition were not Evil antecedent to all Revelation, and which are so where Revelation is not, as well as where it is.

Secondly, From hence it follows that those things may be acceptable to God, which in their own nature do tend to drive Religion out of the World; and that may be *true Worship*, which will unavoidably debase the Deity in the thoughts of Mankind. For so do Idolatry and Superstition.

As for the Instances he there takes notice of, I shall reserve them to a more convenient place.

*Conclus. 2.* If things Indifferent be such as are neither Conclus. Commanded nor Forbidden, and that things are not unlawful because *not Commanded*, then things thus Indifferent and not commanded are not additions to the Word of God; and the places usually insisted upon must be understood,  
C

Case of Indiff. things. p. 24.



Cafe examin-  
ed. p. 26.

Pag. 4.

derstood, according to the sense I gave of them; and which may serve as a sufficient reply to what he hath said upon that Head. But yet because he hath offer'd somewhat in a nother place that looks like an Argument, I shall here consider it. He argues thus;

*If obedience be wanting the Salt is wanting to the Sacrifices of our God, which (as we humbly conceive) leaves no more room for perfective than corruptive Additions to Divine Worship &c. What can be an act of Obedience to God but what he hath commanded, whether he hath forbidden it or no? If we bid our Servant go a mile, and he goeth two (possibly hoping to do us Service in it) we hope his going the Second mile is no act of obedience, though we did not forbid him. In matters of this Nature no act of Supererogation is allowable, because it can be no obedience. In answer to which, it will be necessary to resolve this Question:*

*Q. Whether the doing of any thing in the Worship of God without a command be a sinful addition to the Word of God?*

I answer that if the Question is understood of the proper and essential parts of Worship (if I may so speak) then we grant it, and say, that he that shall institute any thing in that kind without Divine Institution, doth challenge Gods prerogative to himself; and because the rule is sufficient, all such perfective are corruptive additions (as he speaks) to both Rule and Worship. It is as if a Servant when bidden to go a mile, he goeth two (possibly hoping to do Service in it) for in matters of this nature no Supererogation is allowable. Thus far his comparison holds, as to matters of the same Nature, and design'd to the same end: and esteemed to be of the same use. As the going of two Miles for one, with an intent to do as good Service, and be as well if not better approv'd for so doing. But if the question be understood of such things as are Adjuncts to Divine Worship, that are not used



used upon the score of any of the reasons aforesaid, then we are not to expect a command, nor do we Sin if we act without it. As for example, a Servant is required to go a Mile upon some service, and he useth a Coat or a Cloak, takes an Horse or goes on Foot, puts a Ring about his Finger to remember him of what he is to do; Or if to carry a Message, considers what to say, and Writes it down, that he may be the better fitted to deliver it; In such cases his Master would think him impertinent to ask Directions, and it's no Disobedience nor Supererogation to act, as he sees fit, without them. And this is the case with us, as I shall afterward shew. This said, there is way made for the next inference.

*Conclus. 3.* If things Indifferent are neither commanded nor forbidden, and things are not unlawful because *not commanded*, it follows that it's no Derogation from the Sufficiency of Scripture to maintain the lawfulness of using such things in Divine Worship, as are not therein commanded. It's somewhat a Specious way of arguing which this Author useth, *the Scriptures have determined whatsoever may make us wise to Salvation, perfect,* *thoroughly furnished to all good Works.* Now if the *Worship of God be a good work, and the right doing of it bath any tendency to make us perfect, they must have a sufficiency to direct us in that.* And he concludes, *If there be not a Rule for all things belonging to the Worship of God (except as before excepted, &c.) then the Scriptures are not able to make us wise, &c.*

*Conclus. 3.*

p. 28.

By this way of arguing and a challenge he immediately subjoyns, viz. *If our Author can shew us any Act of Worship, &c.* It may be thought he is a Champion for the perfection and sufficiency of Scripture, and we the derogators from it. And that without any more ado he would have brought unanswerable arguments for that kind of Scripture-sufficiency which we deny. *If saith he,*

## A Vindication of the Case

pag. 29.

our R. Author can shew us any Act of Worship for the performance of which in such a manner as God will accept, we cannot shew him direction of Scripture. Well! where is it? Scripture, with the addition of such circumstances as are naturally necessary to all Humane Actions, or evidently convenient for an action of a grave and weighty Nature, for the obtaining the ends of it, or appearing to any Common Judgment to be so decent, that without them the performance would be sordid. Scripture with the practice of the first Guides of the Church; Scripture with the light of Nature shining out in every reasonable Soul, &c. Scripture with the exceptions before excepted, in his Book.

pag. 21.

Suppose then we put it to the question, Is Scripture alone a sufficient Rule for matters to be used in the Worship of God? He readily answers, Yes. If you take in the Nature of the thing, the light shining in every reasonable Soul; if you take in Common Judgment, convenience, and decency; Lastly if you take in the practice of the first Guides of the Church; that is, it is, and it is not. Now how he hath all this while pleaded for that Sufficiency of Scripture which we deny. And why he should so loudly exclaim against all Supplements and Additions, to that, and against Reason and Authority, as a Supply: or what difference he hath conceived betwixt Authority & the Guides of the Church; or betwixt Reason and the light of Nature Shining out in every reasonable Soul, so as to deny to the one what he grants to the other, I am not able to understand? Yet for all this there must be a difference betwixt him and us, and somewhat shall be said to make it out. For the Sufficiency of Scripture, is a very great argument. And so indeed it is; and it has been an old argument against the practices of our Church, and is not to be easily parted with: But yet what to give, and what to take, and wherein the difference is betwixt what we hold and he is forced to grant, he knows not,

pag. 38.

pag. 29.

pag. 28.

or

or has not been so kind as to discover.

But however when all this is past over, he concludes as to one part, *we cannot possibly agree with our R. Brother in this thing, viz.* (That we have no such particular directions for Worship under the Gospel as they had under the Law.) This indeed I touched upon, to shew that the faithfulness of Christ and sufficiency of Scripture consist not in giving as particular directions for Worship as they had under the Law; and in proof of this I set Baptism against Circumcision, the Lord's Supper against the Passover, and Prayers against Sacrifices.

*Case of indiffer-  
ent things.  
pag. 30.*

Now let us consider, what are the reasons why he cannot possibly agree? Certainly if ever controversie was like to be ended, we may now expect it, because it's about plain matter of Fact. But in this case he strangely fails of performance: For whereas the deciding the case depends upon the comparison betwixt the Law and the Gospel, he doth not so much as offer any thing about the latter. But let us consider what he saith of the former, and as much as we can, make up his defect in the latter. First, he saith, *As to Circumcision, what particular direction had the Jews? Their Rule extended no further than to the Act and the time.* Here I must confess there is nothing but the time that is determined; But since there is nothing of that kind in Baptism prescribed, the Law is herein more particular than the Gospel.

*pag. 31.*

2ly, As to the Passover, he acknowledges they had a Rule, but then he adds *What Rule, had they to determine them to a Kid or a Lamb?* But was not that a Rule to determine them, when it must be a Kid or a Lamb, and no other Creature; and is not Two to all the Beasts in the world a determination as well as one to two? But was there nothing else determined? (as his cautious way of expressing it would imply) Let him consult the Text, and he will find that the Creature was not only thus to be one

*Exod. 12. &c.*

out

out of two; but it was to be a Male, kept the 14th day, and to be killed at even, without a bone broken, to be roasted, to be eaten in the house, and with unleavened Bread, with bitter Herbs, and none left to the morning. And they were to eat it standing (as our Author acknowledges p. 32.) with their loyns girt, &c. And with several other rites too long to enumerate.

But in the Lord's Supper, there is nothing specified or required but the Elements, and the breaking and pouring out; nothing said of the kind of the Bread or Wine, nothing required of the time or posture, or number, &c.

pag 32.

As for their Sacrifices, he saith, *the Rule was sufficient and perfect, we hope, though one Jew brought a Bullock, another a Goat, &c.* I may confidently say it was not sufficient if so they did, for God was pleas'd to require more (who is the most competent Judge of the perfection of his own Law) For there was a particular prescription not only as to the kinds of the Beasts, but as to the disposing and ordering of them in Sacrifice, what was to be eaten, and what not; whether the blood should be poured out or sprinkled, whether upon the Altar or at the bottom of it, &c, one would think that a person that talks so loosely of these things, had never read the Book of *Leviticus*.

But now as to Prayers in the Christian Church, we have only a general Form given us and direction to Pray in the Name of Christ, but nothing as to Words, Time, Posture, Company, &c.

So that what can be more manifest then that there is no such particular direction given in Worship, as they had under the law? And therefore however it comes to pass that this Author hath here so bewildred himself, yet it's what he hath granted before, when he was saine to make exceptions, as to things naturally necessary, &c and of which he saith in the beginning of this argument, that *for such*  
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it is impossible there should be a Rule; though there, I <sup>Page. 8</sup> conceive, he hath as much erred on one side as he did before on the other, when he saith it's impossible; for then it had not been possible to assign time, posture, place, &c, under the Law. Had he said in some not possible, in others not fit, he had been much more in the right: However (to let that pass) in either way he grants that there is no expectation of Scripture-Authority for such things, nor doth the sufficiency of that or the faithfulness of Christ suffer by such an opinion.

I suppose I may now close this Argument: For, as for his *Or's* and, *Alias's* (which this Author so much depends upon) I shall consider them in another place.

*Conclus. 4.* If things indifferent are neither commanded nor forbidden; and things are not unlawful because not commanded, then the doing of such things as are not commanded is not contrary to the second Commandment; The contrary to this is maintained by our Author, <sup>Case examined</sup> who saith, that *the doing of such things in Acts of external* <sup>pag. 27</sup> *Worship as are not commanded, is indeed a violation of the second Commandment.* For which he offers this reason, *because as in the 6th Commandment it is agreed, that all injuries to our neighbour's person is forbidden under the highest species of such Acts: and in the 7th all species of uncleanness are; so in the 2d commandment all errors in the matter of external Worship are forbidden under the species of Idolatry.*

The answer to this depends upon the understanding of his phrase, *Matter of Worship*, (which he hath given us no light in) which either signifies parts of Worship, and then we yield it, that all such instituted by men are forbidden in this commandment, for it's false worship: but then we deny that we are concern'd in it, or that any thing *not commanded* and used by us is a part of Worship. And if he thinks otherwise he is (as upon other reasons also) concern'd to take up the cause of Dr. Ames that he saith, *he is not concern'd in.* If.



## A Vindication of the Case

If by *matter of Worship* he means the administration and ordering of it, then I deny the parallel, that all errors in Matter of Worship are as much forbidden in the second commandment, as injuries by the 6th, &c. For injuries are of the same Species with Murder, and Acts of uncleanness are of the same kind with Adultery; but errors in the administration of Worship are nothing akin to Idolatry.

2. I deny that the doing of *things not commanded* in the Matter of Worship are so much as *errors* in his sense, since forbidden by no Law, as I have shewed.

*Señ. 2.  
Case of Indiff.  
Things, p. 4. &c.*

The Second point undertaken in the *Case of Indifferent Things* was to shew, that there are things Indifferent in the Worship of God, and that such things, though not prescribed, may be lawfully used in it.

*Case examined  
p. 19, 20.*

Of this, saith our reverend Author, *none (that we know of) ever doubted*; and again, *as it's stated in that Tract, none in his wits did ever deny it.*

*Defence of the  
principles of  
love, part 2.  
p. 97.*

I do not think my self obliged to answer for some mens understandings; but if that be true, what must we think of those whom Mr. Baxter writes of, *that will have a Rule for every thing*; and adds, *take heed of them*? What of such, that when they grant Things Indifferent to be neither commanded nor forbidden, will yet say, that things not commanded are forbidden? What of such, that when they have granted (and so it's then granted on both sides) that there are Things Indifferent in the Worship of God, will yet say, that *the Indifferency of actions to be done while they are employ'd in the Worship of God is all the Question*? Lastly, What of those that when they have yielded that things Indifferent, though not prescribed, may be lawfully used in Divine Worship, will have it put to the Question, Whether things not necessary to all human actions may be used in it? Who they are, or how far they are concerned

*Case examin'd  
p. 15.*



concerned in the foregoing Character, I leave to this Reverend persons Consideration.

But although *none in his Wits did ever deny* the Question as stated by me, yet because it may be of use toward the clearing of the matters hereafter to be discoursed of, I will briefly consider the case as it was then stated and that will appear from the things considered in the state of it, and the ways taken to prove it.

1. It was granted that things naturally necessary to the Action were excluded; since generals act but in their particulars; and if some of the kind must accompany the Act, then this or that particular of the kind is lawful to be used, as it is in time place, habit. This he grants, but only adds, that *Habit surely is not necessary, we read of none before the Fig-leaves were sown together, Gen. 3.* Pag. 7.

But (1.) We indeed read of no habit before the Fall, but is there nothing natural to man since the Fall? What doth our Author think of the Apostle's *Natural Body*, &c as opposed to Heavenly, or of the description he gives of the state of mankind, when he saith, *we are by Nature Children of Wrath*: We read of no such Body or state before the time of the Fig-leaves. And yet the Apostle makes bold to call them *Natural*, as belonging to man in his present fallen State. *1 Corinth. 15. 44. Eph. 2. 3.*

(2.) Therefore we have a further notion of *Natural* given us, and that is when any thing is suted to the Nature or State of the thing or person. Thus *Ames* and others tell us of *Natural Ceremonies*, as lifting up the eyes to Heaven in Sign of Devotion, (which by the way is not so Natural; but that casting them down in Worship is a sign of it too, as in the publicans.) And so *habit* is Natural to man, as belonging and suted to his present condition. But, saith he, it is not *Natural*, for a person may *Pray naked*; and so he may pray

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pray blindfold, and yet will any one say, sight is not natural to man. But how may he pray naked in Religious assemblies (for we are speaking of publick Worship) can he say it's sutable to the Solemnity? And so going naked is as little sutable to the nature of man.

(3.) Again that's natural, which is the effect of Nature, though not born with us. And I am apt to think that did our Author live within the Circle of the Frigid Zone, he would without any Tutor, without the knowledge of what is *the custom of Civilized Nations*, without any moral reason, have thought upon the benefit of Frieze, or somewhat of the like use with that. But suppose I am mistaken, how hath he mended the matter? He tells us, that *by the custom of Civilized Nations some habit is necessary*. But then what becomes of the Fig-leaves, what of the coats of Skins God clothed *Adam* with. Now to say it came from custom before custom was, (for it was in the beginning) I think, is much more absurd than to say that Habit was natural.

Gen. 3. 21.

But it's time to pass on to a more profitable argument.

2. It was proved that all things, which in general and for kind are morally necessary are also lawful in their particulars. This was made evident from a parity of reason 'twixt what is naturally, and what is morally necessary, and therefore he that grants the particulars of what is naturally necessary, to be indifferent, must also grant the particulars of what is morally necessary to be indifferent. And as it follows this Time or that, this Place or that, this Habit or that is lawful and indifferent, because Time, Place and Habit are necessary: So it also follows this Method or that, this Form or that, this Order or that is lawful, and may be used, because Method, Form, and Order are necessary. And therefore we need look no  
more

more for an institution for a Form, than, as he saith for a *Bell to call to Worship, or for a Gown or Cloak to preach in, &c.* For what Naturally necessary is to the particulars of its kind, that is Morally necessary to its particulars: And one is no more unlawful for want of an institution or command, than the other. This our Author also yields to, *We, saith he, having agreed that there are some circumstances of Humane actions, in Gods Worship, not only Natural, common to all actions, but of a Moral nature too, relating to them as such actions, which God having neither commanded nor forbidden, may be used, are not much concerned, in what our Author saith upon his second Head.*

*Case examined  
pag. 18.*

*pag. 14.*

3. It was further shewed in the aforesaid Treatise, that such things in Divine Worship as were agreeable to the Rules of the Apostle, and served for Order, Decency, and Edification, were also lawful, though they were neither Naturally nor Morally necessary; nor did necessarily arise from the nature of the Thing, as Method and Form, &c. do; that is, that there are a certain sort of things that are ambulatory and contingent, that vary with circumstances, ages, places, and conditions, &c. As, the being cover'd or uncover'd in Worship; such and such fixed hours of Prayer; The Love-feasts, and Holy-kiss, and besides, several Civil usages transferr'd from secular affairs into the Service of Religion; which were used therein not as meer Civil Rites; as I there shewed.

*Case of indifferent things  
p. 8, 12, 13.*

This argument taken from Civil usages our Author endeavours to avoid several ways.

1. He saith, *If we do not mistake, the reason why Dr. Ames and others do think that Civil usages may be used in Acts of Worship, is because they are either necessary to the action, as Humane, or convenient, comely or grave, &c.* And because I had said \* that if the being

*Case examined.  
pag. 18.*

*\* Case of indifferent things.  
pag. 14.*

*Case examined,*  
*pag. 19.*

Civil usages did make them lawful in Divine Worship, then there is nothing in Civil cases but may be introduced into the Church, though never so absurd, he saith, *he cannot apprehend the consequence*, because what is granted about Civil usages is to be applied to grave actions and ~~none~~ other. But to this I answer, Grant they are thus to be understood of such *Civil usages* as are *grave*, yet then it is not so much because they are Civil, as because they ~~are~~ grave, that they may be used, and provided that they were grave, they might be used if they were not Civil, as well as if they were, and are not the sooner to be used, because they are Civil. And then what becomes of their argument for such and such practices and customs that they were Civil? And what have they got when to avoid the force of what we say from the Love-Fests, &c. plead, as he doth, that they are *Civil usages*. So that when he and his brethren grant, *that such usages which may ordinarily be used in other Humane actions of a grave nature, may be used in Acts of Worship* (which is more than we dare say; for then standing crosses may be introduced into Worship, which are used to very grave purposes in Civil matters, as to distinguish Christian from Heathenish or Turkish Dominions, &c.) I know not what they can deny.

*Pag. 18.*

2. He gives a very partial account of Civil usages, when he tells us of *Orators Pulpits, and Seats, and Bells, Gowns and Cloaks*: But in the mean while forgets that there are Civil usages, that are of a Ceremonial Nature, and that are used by way of signification, distinction, &c. As now a garment is (I may still say) Naturally or (as he will have it) Morally necessary, but when in a particular case it's required that it be White or Purple, it's a Civil usage, and is by way of signification; and so the signification is transferr'd with it from

a civil to a sacred use, which how consistent it is with their principles I leave it to his consideration.

3. He takes no notice of the Argument used by me, that if civil usages without institution may be lawfully used in Divine Worship, this (with his concessions before about Natural and Moral circumstances) will justify most, I had almost said, all the practices of our Church, as I instanced in the Surplice, since White was used as a badge of Royalty and Dignity, of joy and innocency, in Civil cases, and so may be used by way of signification in Religious; and so of the rest. All that he hath to say about the Surplice is, that *it's tied to Worship*, which is remote from the case in hand, and shall afterward be considered.

*v. Brightman in Ames Fresh Suit, part 2. p. 505, 510.*

To this I may also add the Cross, which he saith, *they do not stumble of making upon a pack of Cloth or Stuff, or upon a Sheep for note of distinction*, and may be, and is used for graver purposes in the like way of signification in Civil matters as I have observ'd) and so may be, by this Argument transfer'd into the Service of Religion.

*Pag. 15.*

4. It was further maintain'd in the stating of the Case, that the ordering and administration of the things relating to Divine Worship, was left to Christian prudence. To this our Author saith, *It is very true, these must be determined by human prudence, but that they must necessarily be determined by the prudence of the Superiour, and may not be determined by the prudence of the agents, is another Question.* Who ever affirmed it? That they are left to human prudence to fix and determine, is all that I maintain'd; but how far Superiours may determine, and how far Inferiours must submit to things so determin'd, is another Question, and belongs to another place.

*Case of Indiff. Things, p. 5, 6.*  
*Case examined, p. 7.*

From what hath been said, it may appear whether *no man ever doubted* of the truth of the Case as



# A Vindication of the Case

pag. 19.

I have stated it, when he himself speaks so dubiously and uncertainly about it. But because I have not stated it to his mind, and *that it's not the Dissenters position, but only a position, which their adversaries have imposed upon them without any ground, as he saith ; let us see how he states the Question, which is thus :*

*Ibid.*

*Q. Whether things, the doing, or not doing of which God hath not prescribed, being neither necessary to the action as an human action, nor convenient for it (with reference to those that perform it) for the ends of it, nor naturally, nor in common judgment such, without which it cannot be done decently, may be lawfully used in the Worship of God by all persons, or by any persons, who judge that God hath forbidden the part to which they are by men determined, either in the letter, or by the just reason, and consequence of Holy Writ, as forbidding all useless and superfluous things, in so sacred actions, or things not necessary, and used ordinarily in Idolatrous and Superstitious services, or judging, that in Worship every man is sui juris, and ought not to be deprived of the liberty God hath left him, may be universally and lawfully used :*

pag. 23, 24.

This he hath elsewhere formed into a position, and from thence doth declare, that it lies upon his Adversary to prove, *that those things which he would have all Dissenters conform to are,*

1. *Things naturally necessary to all human Acts. Or,*
2. *Things convenient for them as human acts. Or, with reference to the true end of such acts : Or,*
3. *Such as Nature shews to be comely for all human acts, or such grave acts at least, or which common judgment so judgeth. Or,*
4. *That men may do what they reasonably judge sinful. Or,*
5. *That there is no reason to judge useless, and superfluous actions in the Worship of God sinful. Or,*

6. No



6. No reason so to judge of the things not necessary to be used in Gods Worship, and which have been, and are ordinarily used in Idolatrous Worship. Or,

7. That there is no reason to judge, that Christians in matters of Worship ought to be left at liberty in things when God hath so left them.

Whether this be indeed the Dissenters position he best understands (as I should think) but whether it be their position explained, (as he saith) or confounded, I leave to the judgment of others. This only I am sure of, that for as much as I can understand of it, I may turn his own words upon him, and whereas he saith of the Case as I have stated it, *None in his wits did ever deny it*, I can say as it's stated by him, *None in his wits did ever affirm it*. For who *in his wits* will ever affirm that it's lawful to use such things in the Worship of God, that are sordid and indecent, disorderly and confused, idle, useles, and superfluous, hurtful and pernicious?

pag. 19.

pag. 24.

And yet (according to him) this must he do, that will undertake to prove, that things that are not comely, convenient, or edifying, may be admitted thereinto. For this Author tells us, that *by Decency we can understand nothing but what is oppos'd to sordidly, &c.* And if it be not decent by his rule, it must be sordid: And so of the rest.

pag. 11.

Again, Who *in his wits* will affirm that *men may do what they reasonably judge sinful*? And yet these things must they affirm that will attack this position of our Authors: By which stating of the Question and mingling things of a different nature together, he hath provided well for his own security, and may without fear of being conquer'd, or so much as oppos'd, fling down the Gantlet, with, *If our R. Author hath taken the position, as here stated, and argued it, we shall consider what he hath said; if not, we shall lightly pass over what*

pag. 25.

he

## A Vindication of the Case

he hath said, &c. and expect till he hath justified all or any of the last Seven mentioned particulars.

But I shall not so lightly pass over what he hath said without clearing what may be cleared, and reducing the Case into its proper principles, though it be what he hath taken no care to explain or prove.

If we review his seven particulars, we shall find that the (a) 4th. and 6th. (b) belong not to this case, and are elsewhere resolved: And of the Five remaining Four of them are reducible to one argument, which come now to be considered; and the last of *Christian Liberty*, I shall treat upon in the close of this Discourse.

(a) *V. case of a scrupulous Conscience, Dr. Calamy's Sermon on that Subject.*

(b) *the case of Symbolizing, and the defence.*

In treating upon the Four that belong to one argument and have for their subject *Human Acts*; I think it may be done by putting and resolving the following Question.

*Q. What is it that doth make things in themselves lawful and indifferent, to be unlawful in Divine Worship?*

This is the main seat of the controversie; it being agreed that there are indifferent things in the Worship of God; But since we afterward divide upon it and say that notwithstanding this there are some things of that nature, that are by circumstance unlawful, it is fit to understand, how this Question is resolved by one and the other.

If We state the case, we say the Rules we are to guide our selves by, are those of the Apostle, of Decency, Order, and Edification. And we trouble not our selves nicely to consider whether the Decency arise from the nature of the thing, or from common usage, or prescription, or institution, since we think that decency may arise from any, and it matters not from what cause the thing proceeds, nor how it came to be Decent; when it's now thought and found to be so. And as little curious are we about the first reasons of Order and Edification,

fication, for we are so little speculative in matters of practice, that we think the peace of the Church, and Unity amongst Christians, are much more fit to determine us in these cases than all the accuracy in Metaphysics.

So that if a thing be found to be decent, orderly and for Edification, though we were assur'd it did Spring from Humane Institution, we think it to be lawful, and that Humane Institution cannot make that unlawful; which is found by use and experience to be for Decency and Order.

Again we think that those things which in kind are necessary to Humane Acts in all cases, and comely and grave in Worship as well as out of it, may be appropriated to Worship: and that the appropriation of Places, Time and Habit to Worship, doth not therefore make such Places, Times, and Habits, unlawful to be used.

And if things indifferent in themselves are unlawful in Worship, we conclude it must be when Divine Institution is pretended for what is Humane, and when the things sute not the Nature, or defeat the ends of Divine Worship; or for the like reasons which I in the controverted Tract did insist upon.

*Case of indifferent things.  
p. 24, &c.*

But now on the contrary, by what may be Collected from him, it appears to be the Sence of his position,

1. That nothing of Humane Institution is to be admitted or may lawfully be used in Divine Worship. For thus he saith, they must be *things necessary to all Humane Acts, or convenient for them as Humane Acts, or comely for all Humane Acts, &c.*

2. That nothing, though necessary, or convenient, or comely, ought to be used in, and much less be appropriated to the Worship of God; for they are to be

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considered

considered in Worship only as they have a reference to such *Humane Acts*.

In the consideration of these I shall

1. Consider how he attempts to prove it.
2. Endeavour to discover the mistake; and vindicate the arguments and instances, produced in *the case of Indifferent things* to the contrary, from his Exceptions.

These are the chief things that all his discourse is founded upon, and that are scattered through it: But *though* they are rather supposed than proved by him; and therefore (to use his own Words) *I may lightly pass them over, and expect till he hath justified them*: yet because I would make somewhat of it, I shall collect from the Hints he gives, what it is that he doth think may be said for them.

Prop. 1.

As for the first of these, that *nothing is to be used in Divine Worship that is meerly of Humane Institution*, his arguments are fetched from the Nature of the things pleaded for them, viz. Decency, order, edification. As, saith he,

Arg 11.

1. *We cannot apprehend it in the power of Man to Create a Decency. The greatest Emperors wearing an Antick Habit, would not make it Decent, till it could prescribe, or had obtained a common consent.* This I the rather mention, because it is an argument much in vogue amongst those that would artificially handle this matter. But here let me ask them what it is creates a Decency? He saith, *the Law of Nature and prescription, common consent and the guise of Countries.* But how began that *Prescription*, whence arose that *consent*, whether from chance or institution? Or what is it whence it ariseth, if it be found to be decent? Certainly if it began in one of these *institution* is the more noble of the two, and the less disputable: And then it would be hard

to

to conceive how that which came by chance should be lawful, and that which came by Institution should be unlawful.

But (2.) If *Prescription*, and *Common Consent*, and the *Guise of Countreys* be the measure of Decency, may not these things also be the measure of it in the Church, and in things relating to Divine Worship? And is not the *custom of the Churches of God* a reason as sufficient to conclude us in this matter as the grave and Civil customs of a Nation? Or (3.) Is there any Church on this side *Rome* that by a *Sic volo* doth stamp a decency upon its Institutions, without respect to prescription and the custom of Churches? Or that can do it? By his way of expressing himself, he would make the Argument great, as if to *Create a Decency* was an invasion of God's Prerogative; *We cannot apprehend it in the Power of man to Create a Decency. The greatest Emperor, &c.*

But if a Decency arise from the *Guise of Countreys*, and *Prescription*, and *Common Consent*, it might be questioned, whether according to him, God himself can then *Create a Decency*, and by his authority make that to be at once which requires time and Custom (as he saith) to produce and form it? So high doth the power of a little School-subtilty and Imagination sometimes transport men, that their Arguments vanish out of sight, and are lost to all those that converse with what is gross and tangible.

But supposing *it is not in the power of man to Create a Decency*, yet Order may be Order without those dilatory reasons of Custom and Prescription; and therefore what holds against establishing Decency by institution, will not hinder but that order may be thereby established. Therefore,

2. He further argues from the Nature of Decency and Order, that things of meer Humane Institution are not capable of that plea. *We can understand*, saith he, no-

*ibid.*



# A Vindication of the Case

thing, by orderly, and according to order, but without confusion. By Decency we can understand nothing but what is opposed to sordidly; nor can we think of any action that is not Decent, if the contrary to it be not indecent. So then nothing ought to be done in the Worship of God, but what may be done without Confusion, &c. of which Nature can nothing be that is idle and superfluous, &c.

Ames's Fresh  
Suit, & answer  
to Bp. Morton.  
Jean's Uniformity  
in answer  
to Dr. Ham-  
mond.

I was at a great loss at first to find out the drift of all this, but upon consideration I think it contains these things: (1.) That it is unlawful to ordain or use any thing superfluous in the Worship of God. (2.) That whatsoever is not for Order, Decency and Edification is superfluous. (3.) That nothing is Decent, if the contrary to it be not indecent. It's the last of these we are now concerned in; which by the help of the great managers of this Argument, may be better understood. And it amounts to this, that Decency and Indecency are contraries (rather privatives saith *Jean*) And if one of them be not Indecent, the other cannot be Decent: And if the Action may be performed decently without what is called Decent, then that which we call so is not Decent. As suppose it's pleaded that a Surplice is Decent, but if the contrary be not Indecent, and the Service may be performed decently without it, then that Vestment is not Decent.

In answer to which I shall not concern my self in a tedious and nice dispute about the nature of Contrarieties and Privatives, but readily grant the opposition which they insist upon betwixt Decent and Indecent; And yet notwithstanding shall make bold to deny the whole they infer from it: And that for this reason, because our Dispute is not about the Nature of Decency and Indecency, but about things Decent and Indecent: And although Decency and Indecency be opposed as above said, yet it is not so  
in



in the things controverted, but that things different may be both of them, Decent.

As for Example, he grants that *it's comely and grave to preach in a Gown*; and that they look therefore for no Institution; but now by this way of arguing it could not be so: For if a person may preach decently without a Gown, then it cannot be Decent to preach with it, because Decency and Indecency are contraries, and if the contrary be not Indecent, (as it is not to preach without it, must he say,) then to preach with it is not Decent. Pag. 18.

So again, what Decency is to Indecency, that is Reverence to Irreverence: But, he saith, that kneeling at the Sacrament is Decent, (for saith he, *no Dissenter refuseth to receive the Sacrament kneeling because it is not Decent*) and Reverent. But it can be neither of these by his argument, for they also affirm that it may be Decently and Reverently received, though they do not kneel; and therefore the contrary to kneeling being not Indecent, kneeling cannot be Decent. And thus I might run on *in infinitum*; and the like may be argued from the account he gives of Order. Pag. 36.  
Pag. 13.

The ground of his and the others mistake is, that they argue from the kind to the individuals of the kind, as if one individual was as much opposite to the other as kind to kind, whereas the individuals are mutable things, which the guise of Countreys, and custom, &c. alter; and two things different in use or figure, or the like, may be both of them Decent, as to wear a Cloak or a Coat in Secular business; a Cloak, Gown, or Surplice in Religious Solemnities, (according as the custom is.)

Therefore the Brethren at the Savoy let this curious speculation fall, and grant, *there are some things* *Proceedings at the Savoy, p. 62.*  
Decent

1 Cor. 7. 35.

Decent and orderly, when the opposite species is not undecent or disorderly. And a greater than they said it was comely, with respect to the then state of the Church, not to marry, and yet without doubt it was not thought uncomely to marry too; which yet the Apostle could not have said, if our Authors way of arguing had been of any force.

Against Dr.  
Hammond.  
pag. 80.

After all this pert discourse against things instituted we are little concern'd, not only because there is nothing like things meerly instituted by men in our Church except the Cross, ( which Lay-Communion is not concerned in ) but also because even that and all things that can be forced to look this way are not now instituting, but are received as having been so long before, and are not the subject matter of Institution, but of Civil and Ecclesiastical Command betwixt which there is a vast difference, as, Mr. Jeans rightly observes; *There is difference 'twixt Institution, and Commandment or Appointment; for though every Institution be a Commandment or Appointment, yet every Commandment or Appointment is not an Institution. And hence a Church in a place may command and appoint the uniform observance of Ceremonies, instituted unto its hand by the Church in former ages.*

Prop. 2.

As for such particular things as were owing to meer Institution ( which I produced in the above said tract ) in respect of their use and signification, I shall keep them in my eye, though I lay them aside for the present to come to his next head.

Nothing, though necessary, or, convenient, or comely, ought to be used in, and much less appropriated to the Worship of God; being all such things are to be considered therein only as they have a reference to humane acts. This he asserts not only in the Propositions which he draws from his general position,

sition, but also elsewhere; so he saith, that they comply with *meer necessary, or convenient circumstances* Pag. 23. *either of Actions, or such or such Actions, considered abstractly from any Religion.* And therefore he concludes,

1. They must not be used in Religious Worship. So he saith, *Those who stumble at the Surplice (as not many do) or the Cross, or kneeling at the Eucharist, scruple to do it in an Act of Worship.* So again, *The Minister must wear his Surplice in his Acts of Worship, and sign with the Cross within the complex Act of Worship, (for he after it with prayers concludes the Action.) The People must kneel in the act of Receiving.* What then? Why then they are unlawful. Now how the things that are necessary in general (as Posture, Habit, &c.) can be used without particulars, or how those particulars can be used in Worship lawfully, and yet be unlawful, because used in Worship, I understand not. For then sitting would be unlawful, if alike required, and a Gown be unlawful, and the Ring in Marriage unlawful, and the laying the hand on the Book unlawful, (at the former of which is a prayer annexed, and at the latter it is implied,) and all Civil Usages in Worship would be unlawful: And then what will become of what he hath elsewhere said? *Dr. Ames and others do think that such usages which may ordinarily be used in other humane actions of a grave nature, may be used in Acts of Worship; and being so used are no more than appendants to the Action, &c.* Pag. 18.

But being sensible that this will not do, and that unless he can make the *being used in Worship* to be the same with Worship, to be an act or a part of it, he cannot make it unlawful, and that if he should attempt it, it would be but to disparage the cause, he makes a second adventure.

2. That

# A Vindication of the Case

pag. 12.

2. That which is appropriated to Worship is unlawful. *Some of them cannot but look for an Institution for a Garment [ meaning the Surplice ] which they must be tied to use in the Worship of God, and restrained from the wearing of at other times.* Now because this would open a gap too wide for him to stand in, and would condemn Places, as well as Habits, and make it as unlawful to use a Church as a Surplice, he therefore cautiously begins it with *Some of them*: But yet however he gives us a reason for it, *viz. Because the appropriation of it to the Religious act, speaks something of Religion and Homage to God in it.* Elsewhere he expresseth himself after the like manner, *We think they ( civil usages ) must not have any thing of the nature of Worship in them, but may as well be used in meerly Civil actions, as in Religious Duties. If there be any thing of Homage to God in them they are Worship which must have an Institution.* But, First, What doth he mean by *appropriation*, doth he thereby understand that what is for the present appropriated to a Religious use and Service cannot be omitted, nor altered, nor upon any reason whatsoever be applied to any other use? This our Church doth not hold. ( a )

( a ) Homilies  
Sermon of good  
works pt. 2  
Sermon of  
Prayer. pt. 2.  
Article. 34.

Is it that out of a Reverence to Divine Ordinances, it is not fit that the things used in or at Divine Worship be prostituted to vulgar use, that what are Churches for an hour or two on the Lord's day be not Stables all the week after; nor the Tables and Plate used in the Lord's Supper, be employd, in the service of the Taverns? This we agree to, and think our selves well able to defend against any arguments we have yet seen to the contrary. 2ly. Doth appropriation necessarily imply *homage* to God; may not things be thus separated, for Order and Uniformity, for Gravity and Decency, for Reverence

Reverence and Respect to the Solemnities of Religion? And may not this Reverence and Respect we shew to the solemnities of Religion, and the Devotion we shew in external Worship redound to God himself?

Indeed what are all the outward acts of Reverence but expressing of Homage, Veneration and Adoration to God? I do not think the Holy Psalmist forgot himself when he said, *Come let us Worship, and fall down, and kneel before the Lord our Maker*: Or that our Author himself said amiss, when he maintains, that *Nature teacheth us to Worship God in the most decent manner we can*. For though *Adoration* be to be given to God alone, yet *Reverence* (as our Author distinguisheth) is due to all things relating to him, and to that Worship we pay to him: And as there are several Acts of Worship due to God; So there are some things due to his Worship, by which his honour is advanced and devotion furthered. But for this I refer him to what was said elsewhere, which he was pleased to take no notice of.

Ps. 95. 6.

pag. 29.

pag. 13. 8c.

Jean's answer to Hammond, pag. 21.

Case of Indifferent things. pag. 29.

But to bring all to an issue I shall now consider the several arguments, and instances I produced to prove that *things indifferent, though not prescribed, may be lawfully used in Divine Worship*.

This I proved from the old Testament and New, from the practice of the Primitive and Modern Churches, and from their own Concessions.

1. The instances I chose to give from the Old Testament were *David's Temple*, the Feast of Purim, and the Synagoga! Worship: To these he answers at once, that *they are answered long since by Dr. Ames in his Fresh Suit*. And perhaps may be answered by him after the manner he defended the objection taken from the second Commandment, which our Author himself gives up: But if his Arguments are of force, I suppose,

Case examined. pag. 25.

pag. 27.



Pag. 26.

we shall find it in our Author. And he first begins with *Dauids Temple*, of which he saith, *David indeed design'd a Temple for God without a command, But God check'd him for it for this very reason, 2. Sam. 7. 7. and though he approved his generally good intention, yet he restrained him as to his Act, as may be seen in that Chap.*

This being matter of Fact the Text must determine it, and from thence I observe.

2 Sam. 7. 7.

1. That God had at no time given a command concerning building a Temple. So in the Text quoted, *in all the places with all the children of Israel spake I a word with any of the tribes, &c. saying, why build ye not me an house of Cedars?*

Vers. 1

2. *David* in designing it went upon rational grounds (1.) as God had given him rest, and so it became him to do it in point of gratitude, and because he had an opportunity for it. (2.) From comparing his own house with God's, *See now I dwell in an house of Cedar, but the Ark of God dwelleth within curtains.*

Vers. 2.

1 Chron. 28.

2. 3.

3. It was no rash act, for it seems he had at that time made ready for the building, having it a long time before in his thoughts. Of this see Dr. *Lightfoot*, *Temple* c. 40.

1. From all which I infer, that neither *David* in designing, nor *Nathan* in approving what he design'd, thought it absolutely unlawful to do what was not commanded in the Worship of God, or that what was not commanded was forbidden. This must be granted by our Author, that saith, *God approved his generally good intention*, now what was his intention generally but to do somewhat in honour to God, and for the solemnity of his Worship? Thus much Mr. *Pool* doth yield, *The design being pious, and the thing not forbidden by God, Nathan hastily approves it.* Now if he approved it because not forbidden by God, then they did not think that what was not commanded, was forbidden; nor doth that of

our

our Author appear to be reasonable, that *God checked him for it, because it was without a command.*

2/y. Supposing that particular Act condemned, yet it is not reasonable to suppose it to be for the general reason, given by our Author, that *nothing must be done without a command*, but because in a matter of that consequence, the Prophet did not advise about it, and that he did *too hastily approve it*, as Mr. Pool saith. But,

3/y. It's evident that the particular Act was not condemned. 1. Because God commended him for it, *thou didst well* (a). So Mr. Hildersham, *Though the Lord would not let David build him an House, yet he commends his affection for it, &c.* (b) 2. God rewarded him for it, for upon it it was promised, (c) *He will make thee an House.* So Mr. Pool, *For thy good intentions to make him an House, he will build thee an House.*

(a) 1 Kings. 8.

17. 18.

(b) Lett. on Job.

Let. 28.

(c) 2 Sam. 7. 11.

1 Chron. 17. 10.

3. He presently gave order upon it for the building such an House; and as a mark of approbation, and a further reward of David's good intention, did both reveal what he would have built, and how (d); And appoint his immediate Successor for the building of it (e).

(d) 1 Chron. 28.

19.

(e) 2 Sam. 7. 13.

4. Though God did deny this Privilege to David, yet it was not without giving him good reason for it, and that was (1.) because things were not settled. So it was before with the tribes, therefore God saith *he walked with them* (f): And so it was with David, (f) *2 Sam. 7. 6,* for though he had at that time rest, (which was 7. vers. 1.

about the 10th, or at most the 20th, of his Reign;) Yet it was far from a settled Peace, and therefore Mr. Pool reads it as the Margin, v. 11. *I will cause thee to rest.* (2.) It was not fit for David, *Because he had been a man of War, and shed much blood.* (g) Now in opposition to this (1.) God saith, *I will ordain a place for Israel, and plant them, &c.* (h) (2.) Of Solomon,

(g) 1 Chron. 22.

7. 8, 9. 28, 3.

(h) 1 Chron. 17. 9

he saith, *He shall be a man of rest, and I will give him Peace*(i).

(i) 1 Chron. 22. 9

So that it appears that it was not unlawful for David to design a Temple nor unacceptable to God that he did design it, but it was deferr'd for the reasons before given, and because it was unseasonable.

Now because the Author has referr'd me to Ames, I will send him back thither, and let him see whether he has answered all this or no.

Ames Fresh  
Suit part 2. §.  
6, and 7.  
Case examined  
p. 26.

As for the *Feast of Purim*, This Reverend person saith, *It lieth upon our Author to prove, the Feast of purim was kept as a Religious Feast. There is no order for any Religious Acts to be performed in it. If it were, it was generally commanded under the precepts of giving thanks for publick mercies.*

I shall therefore undertake to prove it a Religious Feast. But before I proceed I shall 1. observe, That the lawfulness of Religious Feasts and Fasts admit of the same general proof, and if I prove one I prove the other. 2. I observe that the Jews did think it lawful to institute Religious Feasts and Fasts, both occasional and anniversary. Of the latter sort (which is the matter in dispute) were the Fasts of the 4th, 5th and 10th Months, instituted in the time of the Captivity(a).

(a) Zech. 8. 19.

Such was the Feast of Dedication instituted by the Jews in the time of the Maccabees(b), And kept to the time of our Saviour(c), nay to this very day amongst them(d). And so Mordecai and Esther did establish this Feast of Purim, and the Jews took upon themselves to keep it(e). Now that it was a Religious Feast will appear,

(b) 1 Mac. 4. 59.

(c) John 10. 22.

(d) Euxtorf. Synag. Jud.

(e) Est. 9. 20, 27, 29.

1. As it was a day of thanksgiving to God for that great deliverance. Thus it's called *a day of gladness, a good day*(f), which Mr. Pool thus paraphraseth,

(f) C. 8. 17. 9. 18, 19, 22.

(g) On c. 8. 17. Ch. 9. 27.

*a time of feasting, rejoicing and thanksgiving*(g). This further

further appears from the reason given for the celebration of it. *It was, saith the Text, That the memorial of their deliverance should not perish* : or as Mr. Pool, *Because they had seen and felt this wonderful work of God on their behalf.* (h) It appear'd further from the circumstances of it, it's said *They sent portions one to another, and gifts to the poor.* (i) *Which*, saith Pool, *they used to give upon days of thanksgiving, of which see* Nch. 8. 10. (h) C. 9. 25, 31. (i) C. 9. 22.

And I may add, that it is impossible to conceive that persons of such signal piety as *Mordecai* and *Esther*, should institute, and under the present sense of such a deliverance, as the *Jews* were, should observe this Feast, only as a day of Civil Joy, without respect to God that wonderfully brought it about.

2. It was as much a Religious Feast, as their Fast was a Religious Fast; So the Text makes them parallel, *They confirmed these days of Purim, &c. As they had decreed for themselves & for their seed the matters of the fastings & their cry.* (k) But what their Fasting was, the nature of the thing, as well as the Cry here spoken of doth declare. So to go ye and fast, Pool adds, and pray, which was the main business, to which fasting was only an help. (l) But our Author saith; *There is no order for any Religious Acts to be performed in it.* As if they did not know what became them to do upon such a gracious and wonderful deliverance. But we read of no order for such Acts on their days of Fasting, were they not therefore Religious? Nay we read not of the name of God in the whole Book, or of any duty to him plainly expressed, and shall we therefore esteem it not to be Religious and Canonical? (k) C. 10. 31. (l) On. c. 4. 16, and 9. 31.

But saith our Author, *If it were a Religious Feast, it was generally commanded under the precepts of giving thanks.* And I desire no more: For in one Breath he bath

## A Vindication of the Case

hath yielded all. So that now we have gained, that fixed and anniversary festival days set apart for Commemoration of God's Mercies to us, are not only lawful, but what we have a command for. And thence it follows, that a Church hath Power to determine them, as they did. And further that *things not commanded* may be used in Divine Worship.

The next thing is the Synagogaal Worship.

To this he replies, *The Worshipping of God in Synagogues wanted no special Command; Being but a Circumstance convenient, if not necessary to publick Worship considered as an Humane Act. A Multitude of people could not meet to Worship God together without a fit place. But First why did not Synagogues want a Special Command as well as the Temple which he contends for?* For, which is worse, to build a more convenient place for one already instituted, a Temple for a Tabernacle; or to build places for which they had (as he yields) *no special command*, as the Synagogues? But suppose they needed not a Command for Synagogues, *because a Multitude could not meet together without a Fit Place*; yet how will that be a reason that *the Worshipping in Synagogues wanted it not*? That place is a *circumstance convenient*, and that *Synagogues were fit places for a Multitude of people to Worship in*, we grant; and we will grant that this may be a reason to justify the building and using such places *without a special Command*; yet what is that to the Worship so and so ordered in those places? What is that to Days and Hours, which the Scripture speaks of, and he contends against? What is this to the Forms used in their Service, which the Jews do write of? If these are not to be justified though they wanted a Special Command, how was it that our Blessed Saviour and his Apostles did not only frequent the places, but the Service, as our Saviour's Customary Preaching



ing in them doth shew? What is this to the Ritual Observations our Saviour complied with, such as the Passover Cup, and their posture at it, which he shewed his approbation of in his taking the materials of his last Supper from the Rites used in the Passover, as learned men have observed; of which *Casaubon* saith, *Hoc primum observare juvat, quomodo Filius Dei umbras Legis ad veritatem traduxerit.*

This he will by no means hear of, and therefore useth several evasions (for they are no better). Thus when it's recorded that our Saviour told the disciples, *with desire have I desired to eat this Passover with you before I suffer*: and in prosecution of it, that *he took the Cup, and gave thanks, and said, Divide it among your selves, for I will not Drink of the Fruit of the Vine, &c.* he irreverently represents it as if it was no more than if he drunk only to satisfy Nature. For so he saith; *Before Christ* Case examined. Pag. 14. *did eat the paschal Supper, he drank a Cup of Wine, and doubtless at it he drank also, though it be not recorded. People need no Institution to drink while they are eating.*

As if the Evangelist had no more to do than to tell us Christ drank a Cup of Wine with his Meat. Surely there is a better account to be given of this matter; The Text it self shews it. And the Jewish Authors and others that write of their customs, do sufficiently inform us. In which he must be very ignorant or incredulous, that will say (as he doth) that no more is signified by it than that Case examined. Pag. 32. *every one might drink as his appetite required*; and no less irreverent that can think that what is recorded of our Saviour's taking the Cup, and blessing, and drinking in the Passover, was only to serve that end.

The next thing I insisted upon was our Saviour's compliance with them in the posture us'd by them at the Passover, contrary (as he owns) to what was used at the first Institution. Of this, he saith, *Our Saviour used the Jewish posture* -

## A Vindication of the Case

sture in eating the passover, being a posture no where, that we know of, used by Idolaters, nor being any posture of Adoration, but their ordinary posture of eating Meat. 2. He saith, that every one might use the posture which was most convenient for the Nature of the Action: and that he doth not see any reason to conclude they would have shut out any that because of the institution desired to eat it with his loyns girt, &c. 3. That, if they did use any uniform posture, yet it was because they agreed it among themselves. In all which there is hardly any thing said but is full of mistake. As,

1. He saith, the posture used by our Saviour was no where, that he knows of, used by Idolaters, nor was a posture of Adoration. I cannot tell how far our Author's Learning may extend in this matter, but that the posture of discumbing was used at festival Solemnities from ancient times, by the Grecians, Medes, Persians, Indians, Romans, and Jews, &c. and from thence translated to their Sacrificial Feasts, which the Heathens did very anciently observe (a), is sufficiently known (b) insomuch that the whole Solemnity was call'd amongst the Romans *Leclisfernium* (c). This is Confirm'd by Scripture: So Amos. 2. 8. *They lay themselves down upon Clothes laid to pledge by every Altar, &c.* That is, the Beds which they used in the Temples of their Gods, saith Casaubon, (d) from the Jews: So Ezek. 23. 41. For satisfaction in which I refer this Reverend Author to others (e).

And whereas he saith this was no posture of Adoration, he must needs be mistaken, if he grants what they did in those Solemnities in Honour to their Gods to be Adoration. And this they did, for it was an entertainment made for them, the heathens conceiving that the Gods did then feast with them; hence the Poets phrase of (f) *ornare pulvinar Deorum dapibus*. So the Apostle calls their

(a) Herodotus;

l. 1. c. 31.

(b) Casaubon

exercit. 16.

c. 22.

(c) Rosini  
antiq. l. 4. c.

15.

(d) Ibid.

(e) Buxtorf.

Exercit.

xxxv. &

xxxviii.

(f) Horat. l.

6. l. ode. 37.

their Table, the *Table of Devils*? (g) and their lying down there, an *having fellowship with Devils*. (h) Having said thus much, I shall not need to proceed, and shew how sitting, as well as discumbing, hath been also used in Idolatrous Service, both amongst Heathens of old and Romanists now, especially since I have it sufficiently proved to my hands in a book I suppose our Author well acquainted with.

Falkner's Lib.  
bert. Eccles.  
part. 2. c. 3.  
§. 4. n. 10.

As for what he further saith, *If the Jews did use one uniform posture*, &c. there needs not many words to shew how precarious or false it is. For what more precarious than to speak doubtfully (*If they did*) of that which yet is clearly evident they did observe? Or affirm, that *if they did, it was because they agreed it among themselves*, which is to suppose the reason of the thing to be certain, when the thing it self according to him is uncertain? Or what more false since whether it was by agreement among themselves, or by the Authority of the Church, that there was this Uniformity of posture is not so certain, as it is that there was this Uniformity, and that they were universally obliged to use and observe it? For it was required that discumbiture should be used in all Religious Feasts, but especially at the Passover by all without exception, in the first part of the Solemnity. For which I refer our Author to one well-versed in these matters.

Lightfoot.

So little Truth, or certainty is there in what our Author asserts, that *every one might use the posture which was most convenient*; and that *there was no reason to conclude they would have shut out any from their paschal Societies that desired to eat it with his loyns girt*, &c. or standing.

The next instance produced in the above-said *Case of Indifferent things*, and objected against by our Author, is the *Hours of Prayer*, which were observ'd amongst the Jews, at Morning, Noon, and Evening. Act. 2 15. c. 10.9. c. 3. 1.

Case Examined,  
P. 15.

Of these our Author gives this account: *Thus the Apostles used the hours of Prayer, which also they might have changed, if they had pleased. That the Jews sent any to Goals, or excommunicated any for not keeping to those hours we do not find. There is nothing of Religion in the time, more then in any other part of time. Thus St. Paul used Circumcision and Purification.*

Pag. 1.  
Pag. 14.

*Thus:* How is that? Did the Apostles use the hours of Prayer onely as necessary circumstances of Humane affions, or such without which the light of Nature, or Common usage shews the thing cannot be done, or conveniently or comelily done, as he saith? Or rather did they not use them as they found them instituted and observed in the Jewish Church? And not for his *Thus*, and the reasons given by him? Will those reasons justifie those very hours of the day, or the just number of three hours? Or however, how will they Justify the Prayers used at those hours; But whatever exceptions he had against the time, he it seems found nothing to say to the Service, which yet was pleaded as well as that.

Case of Indifferent things.  
P. 11.

But he saith, *There is nothing of Religion in the time.* Ifso (as is granted) then it's in the power of a Church to institute and determine it, where there is no other Religion in the Time, than as it's thus separated to the Service of God.

Lastly he saith, *The Apostles might have changed the Hours of Prayer, if they had pleased.* How might they have changed them? Might they do it as Apostolical Persons, or as Private Members of the Jewish Church? As to the former I find not they did exercise any such Power within the Jurisdiction of the Jewish Church, nor that they had any Commission so to do. As for the latter, I deny it. For if it lay in the power of Private Members of a Church to alter the Hours in which the Church is to assemble, it is in their power to Dissolve the

the Assembly, and there could nothing but Confusion issue from it. I must confess he seems to be at a perfect loss what to say as to this matter. And it appears so when he dares not so much as touch upon the Prayers used. In those hours, and applies his *Thus* to St. Paul's using *Circumcision and Purification*, as if they also were necessary circumstances of *Humane action*; or such without which the light of Nature or Common Usage shews the thing cannot be done, &c. which were things of pure Institution at the first, and what though peculiar to the Jewish Church, the Apostle complied with them in for a time.

The next instances produced in proof of the Proposition were, *Washing the Disciples feet, Love-Feasts, and Holy-Kiss which he joyns together, and of which he saith,*

1. *It's impossible to prove, that they were any more* Pag. 12, 15,  
16, 19.  
*than Civil usages, &c.*

2. *They were not used in Worship.*

Whether it is *impossible to prove* the first or no, doth not rest upon our Author's authority, and yet that is the only thing which he hath thought fit to confront what I produced in proof of it. That they were Civil rites is granted, but that they were used by Christ and the Apostles as *no more than Civil*, is (I may safely venture to say) *impossible to prove*. First, Because there is the reason of the thing against it, as they were instituted and used for Spiritual ends, and in token of Christian Humility and Charity (as I then shewed). Secondly, Case of Indifferent things.  
P. 13. Because of the great Difference there was betwixt them when used as merely Civil, and as used by our Saviour and the Apostles. What this was as to washing the feet, I then shewed where he might be Satisfied and to Case of Indiff.  
P. 9. 12. Buxtorf I may add the Learned Dr. *Lightfoot*. Hor. in Joh. c.  
13. 5.

It appears further they were not merely Civil from the Character given to the kiss of Charity, being called



# A Vindication of the Case

called the Holy Kifs. But This was (saith he) *because the Apostle commanded Christians to use it in a Sober, Temperate, Chast, Or holy manner.* But if this was the reason, then all Kisses, and all Feasts would be holy: But now Holiness stamps somewhat peculiar upon the thing it's applied to, and signifies that by Some act, end, or use, it's Separated from the rest of the same kind. And for this reason was it more likely the kifs was called Holy, from its end, use and signification (as it was a Testimony of that Holy and intire love, which was or ought to have been amongst Christians) rather than in respect of the manner; for what reason was there for that, when it was betwixt persons of the same, and not a different, Sex. Besides, if it was a meer Civil rite, and design'd for no Religious end, could we think the Apostle would require it, and close his Epistles so frequently with it? Lastly, it appears they were not used as mere Civil Rites, because they were used in Religious Assemblies, and some of them annexed thereunto. Of this (he saith) *he can never prove, that while Our Saviour was Worshipping his Father he stept aside to wash his Disciples Feet: Or that the Primitive Christians were either Kissing or Feasting one another in the Time or Act of Worship, as Praying, &c.* It would have become our Author rather to have removed the proofs given of this, than to call for more: which if he had considered he would have expressed himself with more caution and reverence. That washing the Disciples feet had a Spiritual signification, I have shewed, and so was not unfit for a Religious Solemnity; and that it was used in such, the Apostle shews, *Joh. 13. 4.* for a further account of which I leave him to the Learned *Casanbon*; How and when the Holy Kifs was used, and how it was called the Seal of Prayer and reconciliation, I then shewed, and is so fully proved by *Dr. Falkner*, that there

Pag. 16.

Exercit. 16. n.  
22. & 24.

Libertas, l. 2. c.  
1. §. 3.

there needs no more to be added, till that, at least, be refuted. That the Love-Feasts were joyned to, and used at the same time as the Lord's Supper, not only the Apostle's discourse upon it sheweth; but also the change of Names, and the giving of one to the other doth confirm it. For *Theophylact* supposeth that the Apostle calls the Love-Feast by the name of the Lord's Supper: And on the contrary *Tertullian* declares that from hence the Lord's Supper came to be called *Ἀγάπην*. It were easy to heap up Authorities in this kind, but that is done to my hand by such as write upon this Custom.

1 Cor. 11. 20.

Apel. c. 39.

V. Vines on the Sacram. c. 2. p. 25, &c.

After I had proved that *things Indifferent, though not prescribed, might be used in Divine Worship* from the practice of the Jewish Church and that of Christ and the Apostles: I further confirm'd it from the incapacity we should be in of holding Communion with any Church (if it were otherwise) whether Ancient or Modern.

But our Author doth endeavour at once to overthrow it. For saith he, *that every particular Christian must practise every thing which the Churches practise which he hath Communion with, or be concluded to have no Communion with it, is to us a New Assertion.* And so it is to me, who only did maintain these two things, That there was no Church or Society but would be found guilty if things uncommanded were unlawful; and if the having such uncommanded things would make Communion with a Church unlawful, then no Church could be Communicated with. So that all that I affirmed was, there could be no Communion Lawful to such as held it unlawful to communicate with a Church for the Sake of things uncommanded. And who are concerned in this, our Author very well knows; such I mean, as plead this as an argument for their present Separation. But though the Assertion, as he words it, is neither mine, nor true; yet I dare affirm there are some things uncommanded

Case examined  
Pag. 21.

Case of Indifferent things.  
Pag. 15.

## A Vindication of the Case

manded which every particular Christian must practise, or else he can be said to have no Communion with the Churches where such things are practised; Such are Forms of Prayer, and receiving the Sacrament in the Forenoon, and without sitting, where there is no provision made for them that would use that posture, as well as where it is not allowed.

And this was the case in the ancient Churches. To which he replies, *Their practices are great uncertainties, and their writings depraved, or, it cannot be made appear, that none could have any Communion with those Churches, unless he did eat the Lord's Supper fasting, or prayed toward the East.* That their writings are depraved is very true, But that they are so depraved as that there is nothing certainly theirs, is what no one will assert. And that they are not depraved in the passages or things I quoted from thence, is very evident from the concurrence of the Fathers therein, and the general consent of learned men of all sides. As to what he saith that *it doth not appear that none could have Communion with them, unless, &c.* It were easy to refute it, and to shew it in the Instances I gave; and to make it out in one for all, viz. That of *receiving the Lord's Supper Fasting*; of which St. Austin saith thus, *Liquidò apparet, &c. It plainly appears that our Saviour and his Disciples did not receive it Fasting, but shall the Universal Church be therefore reproached, because it receiveth Fasting? And this pleased the Holy-Ghost, that in Honour of so great a Sacrament, the Body of Christ should First enter into the mouth of a Christian. For therefore is this custom observed through the universal Church.* And more to the same purpose may our Author read in that Epistle.

Epist. 118. ad  
Januar.

Now when this was the practice (as they say) of the Universal Church, and that they so practised upon the  
score

score of an Apostolical Precept, as *St. Austin* there saith, (how truly is not my business to enquire) can we think that it was not required? Or that there could be any Communion with those Churches, if any did otherwise? I added to the ancient Church, the State of the Reformed Churches abroad, and shewed how they do use *things uncommanded* in the Worship of God, and how impossible it is upon the principles of those that dissent from our Church, to hold Communion with theirs. To this he replies, *we have not heard of any thing used among them in Worship, &c. but what is prescribed, excepting only some Forms of Prayer relating to the Sacrament.*

2. *None of these receive the Sacrament kneeling.*

3. *They compel not any to receive Standing or Sitting.*

I would be loth to charge our Author with want of diligence or integrity, but how reconcilable this is to it that he saith, I must leave to the impartial Reader. Supposing however the first to be true, yet if they have some Forms they have somewhat *not prescribed*. But have they *only some Forms relating to the Sacrament*?

What then shall we say to *Capellus*, that saith *diverse of them have set Forms of Liturgies*? What to their Formularies, as those of *Holland* and *Switzerland*? What to the *Bohemian* Churches that have also Forms in Singing

of Humane Composure? Have they nothing but Forms of Prayer, what then thinks he of Anniversary Festivals observed in the *Helvetick* and *Bohemick* Churches? And of God-Fathers in Baptism? As much mistaken is he when he saith, *None of these receive the Sacrament kneeling*, as appears from the *Petricovian* Synod, that I quoted in the foresaid Tract. But to this he answers, *it is not at all to be wondred that the Lutherans in that Synod, should determine as they did, &c.* Doth he hereby mean that there were none but *Lutherans* in that Synod, or that the *Lutherans*, in that Synod, only determined it?

Which

*Thef. Salmur.*  
part 3. p. 307.

*Comen. de bono*  
*unit. Annot.*  
cap. 3.

*Confes. Helvet.*  
*Comen. ibid. c.*  
7. c. 3. §. 2.

*Case of Indiff.*  
*Things, p. 9.*  
*Case examined.*  
Pag. 13.

Which way soever he would be understood it's a wretched mistake. For the Synod was composed of those of the *Helvetick, Augustan, and Bohemick* Confession, and subscribed by all of them, and was indeed but one of several Synods they held in Common together. If he had but looked into this Synod, all this discourse might have been saved, and he might have answered his own Question, *We desire to know what more receive Sitting except the Lutheran Churches?* What he produceth the 3d. for, I cannot well understand, for it's all one if those Churches forbid any one particular posture as if they required another. And yet some do forbid Sitting, as the Synod above quoted, and one Church Kneeling.

17. Case of  
Kneeling. p.  
14. 15.

I proceeded further to shew that they themselves could not then be Communicated with, since they do things without prescription; as in administering the Sacraments, conceived Prayer, Swearing, and Church-Governments and order. He saith, *we do not make Sitting necessary*; but that is not the point in dispute, for he by his principles should shew where it is commanded. For conceived Prayer he argues, *How this is prescribed, he and others have been told elsewhere*, and those that have told it, have had a sufficient answer.

Laying the hands on the Book, he saith, *is a civil, no sacred usage*; as if the invoking God, and a solemn testimony of our so invoking him by some external Rite, were merely civil. Such then was lifting up the hand, which was anciently used in swearing, and so appropriated to it, that it was put for swearing it self, *Gen. 14. 22. Ex. 6. 8.* They that can affirm such things as these, may affirm any thing.

As for the things relating to Church-order, he saith, *Ten times more is allowed to matters of Government than Worship.* But he undertakes not my argument taken from the parity of reason betwixt the Kingly and Priestly



Priestly offices of our Saviour: And which the Presbyterian Brethren so approve of as to use the same Arguments for Government as Worship.

*Vindicat. of  
Presbyt. Gov.  
p. 4.*

The Third general was to enquire, how we might know what things are indifferent in the Worship of God. §. 1.

The main things he herein objects against, respect Edification; In handling of which, he thus sums up my sense of it; *Our Author would not have us judge of Edification from what most improveth Christians in knowledg and grace, but from what tendeth most to publick Order*; as if I spoke of Order, in opposition to, and as exclusive of a Christians improvement, whereas I plainly say, and he acknowledgeth it, *that we are not so much to judge of them asunder, as together*. The meaning and design of what I said, was to shew that Christians are to consider themselves as members of a Church, and so to have a tender regard to Communion with it, and not to think their own Edification a sufficient reason, to break the Peace and Order of it.

*Case examined.  
Pag. 31.*

To this he saith several things. In Answer to which it will be convenient to give a clear representation and state of the Case, which I shall do in these Propositions.

1. We must consider that Edification is not the laying a Foundation, but a building upon it, and so there is not the same reason for the breaking Order for the sake of Edification, as there is for the sake of things absolutely necessary to Salvation, and that which will warrant and doth oblige to the one, will not warrant nor oblige to the other. This will serve to shew the little force there is in what this Reverend Author confidently asserts, *We know and are assured, that no man, to keep up any such human bounds (of Order,) ought to omit means by which he may improve his own Soul in the knowledge of Christ, or the exercise of his habits of Grace; by which assertion of his he makes Edification and improvement in*

*Pag. 34.*

H knowledge,

knowledge, &c. as necessary as the knowledge of the Fundamentals of Religion.

*Case of Indifferent things.*  
P. 36.

2. We must consider (as I then observed) that Order is a means of Edification, and therefore if there happens a dispute betwixt observing Order, and improvement in knowledge or grace, it's 'twixt means and means, 'twixt what is for Edification in one way, and what is for it in another, and not betwixt what is for, and what is against Edification, as he would have it understood.

*Case examined.*  
Pag. 35

3. We must observe that when there is a dispute betwixt means and means, the less is to give place to the greater, and what is most for Edification, is to yield to that which is least.

4. That for that reason the Edification of the Church, and the welfare of the whole is to be prefer'd before the spiritual advantage of any particular member; for what the less is to the greater, that is a member to the Church; and if a person cannot serve and improve himself without damage to the Publick, he is rather to sit down without that improvement, than to do mischief to the Community for the obtaining it; And as long as he is not without means sufficient for Salvation, he is in that Case to recede from some further attainments; in doing which, for so good an end, *he is acceptable to God, and approved of men.* So that however our Author may seem to shelter himself under the phrase of *Human Order*,

*Rom. 14. 18.*

*Case Examined*  
p. 34. 35.

yet as long as no Church can subsist without it, and he that takes away Order takes away the Church, and he that saith a person *ought to throw it down to improve his Soul*, takes away Order; he must pardon me if I think that he talks without consideration, for he that talks of Edification of particular Souls, in a distinct notion from the building them up as members of a Church, or of members of a Church without being united as a Church, or of a Church without any means to unite it,

*doth*

doth to return him his own words) but discourse of building Castles in the Air, and what he would be loth his own Congregation (if he hath one) should at every turn put into practice; Of all which, if this will not convince him, I shall desire him impartially to view the places of Scripture quoted by himself from the Apostle; as also what was said before in the controverted Tract, and he hath not yet answered, or has been since discoursed of in another Case.

Case of Indifferent things, p. 41, 42.  
Case of Lay-Commun. p. 39. &c.

The 4th. enquiry in the Tract aforesaid was, How we are to determine our selves in the use of Indifferent Things in the Worship of God? Under which head I shewed what respect is to be given to Authority, whether Ecclesiastical or Civil.

In Answer to which our Author takes up the Case of Imposition, and propounds Two Questions, which in effect are these.

Case Examined, p. 39.

Q. 1. Whether there be any Authority in Church or State, to determine the things which God hath left Indifferent to his people?

Q. 2. Whether in Case they make any such Law, the people may, without sin, obey them?

As for the First, he saith there and elsewhere, We cannot conceive how it is possible that in things of Divine Worship, things of an Indifferent nature should be the matter of any human determination; and again, that in matters of Worship, no Superiours may restrain, what God hath left at liberty. We are not immediately concerned in this First Question, for our business was to consider not so much the extent of our Superiours power, in what Cases they may lawfully command, as in what we may lawfully obey. But yet because he hath herein offered somewhat like an Argument, and because the clearing of this will make way for the Second, I shall take it into consideration. To render his Ar-

Pag. 5. 9. 17. 32. 40.

## A Vindication of the Case

gument the more compleat, I shall repair to a foregoing part of his Book, and make use of that in conjunction with what he saith here, and he thus represents it.

Page. 9

*We cannot be fully of our Brothers mind, that in the Worship of God Superiours may determine circumstances which God hath left at liberty. God left it at liberty to the Jews, to take a Lamb or a Kid, Turtle-Doves or Young-Pigeons, &c. We offer it to the judgment of the whole reasonable World, whether Moses after this might have made a Law commanding the Jews to use none but Kids, and only Turtle-Doves, &c. [for it had been a controulment of the Divine Wisdom.] If not, let not our B. think it strange if we judge the same of words in Prayer, which God hath left at liberty, &c. This is an Argument I find offered long since by Dr. Ames, (a) and which is so considerable in our Authors opinion, that he often repeats it elsewhere (b).*

(a) Fresh suit.  
part 2. p. 300.

(b) Page. 17. 30.  
32. 39. 41.

In Answer to this,

1<sup>st</sup>. I shall consider the Case under the Law, and how far what he hath said will hold good.

2<sup>ly</sup>. I shall shew that there is not that parity betwixt the Case Then, and the Case Now, as to render that unlawful Now, which would have been unlawful Then.

1<sup>st</sup>. I shall consider the Case Then, and I doubt not to affirm, *it would have been no controulment of the Divine Wisdom, for Moses and Aaron to have injoynd the Jews in some circumstances, to have taken a Kid or a Turtle only; As when it was for a publick convenience and necessity: There was somewhat of this kind of Equity in the first establishment of it; So the poor was to bring such of these as he could get: And Mr. Pool saith, These Birds were appointed for the relief of the poor, who could bring no better. And certainly he that grants it was to be left to the discretion and convenience of the offerer which to determine,* (as our Author doth

Lev. 14. 30.

On Lev. 1. 14.

Page. 30.

doth) should not deny the like power to Superiours for a publick convenience and benefit; nor can this be to blot out (as his phrase is) *what God has written*, as long as they do it not in opposition to his Authority. Pag. 17.

2ly. Supposing, that *where God had wrote Or's* (as he saith) and that to command the use of one of them alone, had in that Case been *a controulment of his wisdom*, yet the Case Then is not parallel to ours. For, (1.) The Case was then determined, it was indeed a Lamb or a Kid, but so as no other Beast, a Turtle or a Pigeon, but so as no other bird was to be used instead of them.

But now though there is the *Or* under the Gospel, yet it is without such restraint, for ours is free through the whole kind, and nothing determines us, but a consonancy to the general rules. It's so an *Or* and an *Aliàs*, that nothing of the kind is excepted. So saith our Author himself; *In Prayer God hath left standing, sitting or kneeling, to our choice and conveniency, &c. He hath left us at liberty what words to use, what method or order to observe, &c.* Pag. 30.

(2.) As the disjunction was then determined, so the very disjunction it self was of Divine institution, and the liberty they had to choose one of the two, as well as the restraint of not choosing any but one of the two, was from the special Law of God. And then for Authority to have determined what God had left free, had some shew of *controulment of the Divine Wisdom*; especially if it had been required (as our Author somewhere supposeth) that they should *never have offer'd* any other but one sort of them. Pag. 9. But under the Gospel it is otherwise, for the disjunction, the *Or* and the *Aliàs*, doth not proceed from Divine Institution, but from the nature of things, and sometimes from human Art and Contrivance. As when Washing is commanded, (for I shall not contend about it) all the particulars are comprehended, and the person might be dipped



Pag. 22.

Pag. 35.

dipped or sprinkled, or have water poured on him, as he observes; so in receiving the Sacrament, the posture of the Primitive Church (not of meer standing, as he mistakes me, but) of standing (as I said) by way of incurvation; or sitting, or kneeling, are all comprehended under the general species of posture. Again sometimes this *Or* and *Aliàs* proceeds from human Art and Contrivance, hence the diversity of habits, as a Gown, Cloak, Surplice. Now when this disjunction doth proceed not from Divine Institution, but from the reasons aforesaid, and that there is no special Command of God to interpose, determine, restrain, or disjoyn, it can be no *controulment* of the Wisdom or Authority of God for a Church to interpose, restrain, or determine these matters in his Worship. This is plain in the Case of Meats and Drinks, in which under the Law there was a restraint, an *Or* and *Aliàs*, This and not That, and there is still an *Or* arising from the nature of these things, and yet a determination or restraint herein is no *controulment of the divine Wisdom*, as it might have been under the Law, because there is no Institution that doth interpose: And the Case must be the same in Divine Worship, in which since there is no Institution about these matters, it's no sin to Act in the same way; that is, it's no sin for Authority to limit and determine, and for others to be limited, and determined; which brings me to the next Question.

*Q. 2. Whether in Case such things are determined, people may, without sin, obey?* Upon this our Author speaks very variously, sometimes determining for Authority against the Principle, (a) sometimes for the Principle against Authority (b). And at last leaves it *problematical*, and saith they are *divided* upon it amongst themselves (c). I think not my self at present concern'd to shew the absurdity of this Principle, as, how (if this

(a) P. 7. 38.

(b) P. 9. 30.

(c) P. 39. 40.

this be true) the same things must be lawful and unlawful according as they are required or forbidden by our Superiours, &c. But shall only consider what he offers on its behalf.

1. He saith they may not in this Case obey, without sin, *because nature teacheth us not to part with all our natural liberty.*

2. *Because we have a command to stand fast in the liberty, &c.*

As to the former, I only say (and that's enough) that Nature teacheth us and doth oblige us to part with some of our liberty in Communities: And they are far from being required to *part with all* in ours, and so if his argument have any thing in it, it hath nothing in it as to our Case.

For the Second, I leave him to what was said by way of prevention, in the Tract he opposeth, and which he should have Answered before he had made use of this as an Argument. *Case of Indiff. Things, p. 46.*

All that he hath excepted against upon that subject is the notion I laid down of Christian Liberty, which I said was no other than the Liberty which mankind had, before it was restrained by particular Institution, and he gives this reason against it, *For in that [ viz. Natural Liberty ] we must not stand fast, because Divine Institution hath restrained us in it, &c. neither hath Christ restored us to any such Liberty.* *Case Exam. p. 40.* In Answer to this I shall consider what Natural Liberty is, and then what Liberty it is that the Apostle did treat of? As to the Former, it's no other but the free use or disuse of things Indifferent, whether out of, or in the Worship of God. As to the Latter, it was no other than a freedom from the Jewish yoke of bondage, and that Law that gendred to it, as the whole current of the Apostles discourse doth shew. And therefore it could be with respect to no other

Act. 15. 18.

Case of Indifferent things.  
Pag. 47.

§. 5.

Case Examined.  
pag. 3. 36. 38.

other condition than that which mankind would have been, had there been no such particular Institution, and was in before that Institution. 'Twas the nature of the Law, and the injoining of it by divine Institution, so as it became necessary to them, that made it a *Yoke*, and a Yoke intolerable, and it was a freedom from that Law that constitutes the Liberty which the Apostle treats of in that Epistle: And if it be also to be taken (as our Author would have it) *for a freedom, in matters of Worship, from any thing but what is of Divine Institution*, that is a secondary sense, and which may be taken from some parity of reason betwixt Case and Case, but is not the Apostles, nor the primary sense of it. But take it how we will in this or the other, I there shewed that the Apostles exhortation was of no use to them that plead it against submission to Authority in Indifferent Things, when imposed in or about Divine Worship.

I am now come to the last general head of the aforesaid Tract, which contained a short account of the things required in our Church, as they were either Duty or Indifferent. And for an inforcement of that, and conclusion of the whole, I shall briefly shew how far this Reverend Author consents to, or by his concessions must be bound to acknowledge it. Indeed he sometimes doth tell us, that *Nine parts of Ten of all Dissenters say they cannot comply with things required in the English Liturgy, because they believe the things sinful and unlawful*; And elsewhere, *Two hardly of an Hundred think them Indifferent*: But whether our Author be of that number, or at least has reason so to be, I shall leave to his own conscience, as to himself, and to his concessions as to others. In which I shall observe the method taken in the aforesaid Tract, where I said all things objected against, might be refer'd to Posture, Forms, and Times, and shew'd these to be Natural or Moral circumstances of

of Action, and inseparable from it. Now in general he grants what are such *may be lawfully used*; And if we come to particulars, he doth at last yield it.

PAG. 14.

As for postures what more scrupled and opposed than Kneeling at the Sacrament? Yet of this he saith, *There is no command in it, and it is Indifferent*; that in all probability our Saviour administred it Kneeling, and sitting backward upon his Legs; that no Dissenter refuseth it, because it is not decent, but because it is a posture of Adoration; that our Church doth not intend it as an homage to the Body of Christ there really present, but declares that to do it as to the bread, were an Idolatry to be abhor'd; And in conclusion tells us, that those that hesitate in that point, fear a posture of Adoration used by Idolatrous Papists; which is a consideration of no moment as has been already shewed.

PAG. 22.

PAG. 12.

PAG. 36.

PAG. 12, 13.

As to Forms of Prayer, (he saith) God has left us at liberty what words to use; and further, that for conceived Prayer, we know no body saith no other must be used in Gods Worship; and if so, then Forms may be lawfully used in it: But suppose any scruple the use of them, he saith however, *We know no reason but people may hear them, if any scruples the use of them he may yet have Communion with the Church, we hope, though he doth not act in it as a Minister.*

PAG. 30.

PAG. 22.

Case of Indiff.  
P. 8.

Case EXAM.  
P. 22.

As to time, he saith, the Law of Nature directs; and for Festivals, such as Purim amongst the Jews, he saith, *It was generally commanded under the precepts of giving thanks for publick mercies.*

PAG. 29.

PAG. 26.

Lastly, Are the things required unlawful because imposed? He answers, *Some of us including surely himself are not of that mind*; nay he affirms that the most sober Dissenters will agree in these things, [that is, Natural circumstances] to obey the command of Superiours, provided it be not such as by circumstances is made sinful.

PAG. 30.

PAG. 7.

But if imposition would make them sinful, such a command must not have been obeyed. So that in the conclusion, I see no reason why our Reverend Brother, and the Dissenters he defends, and that *in all things* (as he saith *agree to the Doctrine professed in the Articles of the Church of England*), should dissent from the *Liturgy and Ceremonies of it*, as far as Lay-Communion is concerned in them. Not why he should tell us so much of *Goals, and Sessions, and Judicatures*, and of the *Sufferings they endure*, when it these things be true) it's for not doing what they lawfully can. It is no wonder when such withhold communion from the Church, and set up other Churches against it, that some call them (as he complains) *perverse and contumacious persons*, and others call them *damnable Schismatics* and are so bold as to say that such a separation from that Church, is a separation from Christ; And it's likely he will meet with such that will speak very severe things of his following appeal to God, *Judge O thou righteous Judge between these people, and those who thus pursue them*. I am far from one (God is my witness that is a *smiter of his fellow-servants* as he calls them) nor would have any one do what he verily believeth is unlawful; but I do think it is the duty of all to do what they lawfully can, to hear readily, and consider impartially what may be offered for their satisfaction, and to suffer patiently where they cannot receive it. This I think every truly *conscientious person will do*, and I should question his conscience that doth it not. Certainly (to return him his own words) if our Brethren have any *valle for the Glory of God, for the good and Peace of others Souls, for the preserving the Protestant Religion, for the Union of Protestants against Popish adversaries, for any thing indeed that is good and honest*, they will rather break than any longer draw this jaw



of contention, and will do as much as in them lies for the repairing of those breaches which must be confessed are no less dangerous than scandalous to our Religion.

The Kingdom of God is not Meat and Drink, but righteousness and peace, and Joy in the Holy Ghost.

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FINIS.

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ERRATA

P. Ag. 3. l. 13. r. I should, p. 30. l. *unrepealed*, r. *imply*. p. 31.  
l. 6. r. expressions. p. 89. *where*. add to *Lightfoot*. *Hor.* in  
*Matth.* and *Mark.* p. 46. l. 17. r. Government.

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